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Abstract 
 
 With the spectre of the Euro crisis looming substantially large and scaring potential 
monetary unions, this study is a short-run trip to embryonic African monetary zones to assess 
the Schumpeterian thesis for positive spillovers of financial services on growth. Causality 
analysis is performed with seven financial development and three growth indicators in the 
proposed West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) and East African Monetary Zone (EAMZ). 
The journey is promising for the EAMZ and lamentable for the WAMZ. Results of the EAMZ 
are broadly consistent with the traditional discretionary monetary policy arrangements while 
those of the WAMZ are in line with the non-traditional strand of regimes in which, policy 
instruments in the short-run cannot be used to offset adverse shocks to output. Policy 
implications are discussed.  
 
JEL Classification: E50; G20; O10; O55 
Keywords:  Finance; Growth; Africa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
It is now an economic fact that, the spectre of the European Monetary Union (EMU) 
crisis is looming substantially and scaring potential monetary zones. With renewed interest in 
the economics of monetary union following this EMU crisis, very few papers have recently 
examined the feasibility of the proposed African monetary zones (Tsangarides & Qureshi, 
2008; Asongu, 2012ab; Alagidede et al., 2011). Moreover, studies on the proposed West 
African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) (Debrun et al., 2005; Celasun & Justiniano, 2005) and the 
embryonic East African Monetary Zone (EAMZ) (Mkenda, 2001; Buigut & Valev, 2005) over 
the past decade are scarce. Hitherto, the focus of these studies has been on the optimality of the 
proposed currency areas (Mkenda, 2001; Asongu, 2012a; Buigut & Valev, 2005), costs and 
benefits of candidate countries (Debrun et al., 2005) and adjustments to shocks (Celasun & 
Justiniano, 2005; Alagidede et al., 2011; Asongu, 2012b). Results of the works are broadly 
consistent with one fact: the need for greater improvements in structural and institutional 
characteristics (that will facilitate convergence) in light of a paramount lesson of the EMU 
crisis
1
 (Willet, 2011; Willet & Srisorn, 2011).  
In spite of the substantially documented role finance plays in the economic growth of a 
monetary union (De Avila, 2003), little (if nothing) is known about evidence of the finance-
growth nexus in the proposed WAMZ and EAMZ. According to De Avila, the analysis of the 
main channels through which policy changes may affect growth indicate that, the 
harmonization process has impacted growth (via increase in the level of efficiency of financial 
intermediation) and the liberalization of capital controls has principally affected growth 
through improvements in the degree of efficiency in financial intermediation (p.4). In the 
experience of the EMU (Vickers, 2000), embryonic African monetary zones constitute ideal 
scenarios to analyze the finance-growth nexus. They also present the opportunity of shedding 
                                                 
1
  Serious disequilibria in a monetary union result from arrangements not designed to be robust to a variety of 
shocks.  
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light on some of the unresolved issues on causality between finance and growth in sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA)
2
. In light of the above, this study is a short-run trip to the proposed monetary 
unions in Africa. We assess the Schumpeterian thesis for the positive spillovers of financial 
services on growth. Causality analysis is performed on seven financial development and three 
growth indicators. Schumpeter postulated that an efficient financial system greatly helps in 
economic prosperity. As emphasized by King & Levine (1993), Schumpeter disputed that, 
well-functioning banks spur technological innovation by offering funding to entrepreneurs that 
have the best chances of successfully implementing innovative products and production 
process.  
Opposed to this mainstream consensus are sympathizers of Andersen & Tarp (2003) 
who have concluded that, contrary to what Schumpeterian authors claim, the positive link 
between financial development and growth has not been sufficiently documented in recent 
empirical works.  Andersen & Tarp have vehemently argued that, turning to the empirical 
evidence, the alleged first-order effect whereby financial development causes growth is not 
adequately supported by econometric work. Hence, they conclude that the empirical evidence 
on the finance-growth nexus does not yield any clear-cut picture (p. 1). This second school of 
thought has recently been supported by Asongu (2011a) in a meta-study of 186 papers on the 
finance-growth nexus. It will therefore be interesting to examine the positions of the embryonic 
African monetary zones in light of the above debate. The rest of the paper is organized as 
follows. Section 2 presents the data and discusses the methodology. The empirical analysis is 
covered in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 See “Finance and Growth: A Schumpeterian Trip to Africa” by Baonza (2011) for more details.  
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2. Data and Methodology 
 
2.1 Data  
We examine a sample of 4 West and 5 East African countries with data from African 
Development Indicators (ADI) and the Financial Development and Structure Database (FDSD) 
of the World Bank for the period 1980-2010. Guinea is left-out of the WAMZ due to data 
constraints. The summary statistics of the variables and details on the countries investigated are 
presented in Panel A and Panel B respectively of Appendix 1. Variable definitions and 
corresponding sources are presented in Appendix 2.  
 A number of theoretical papers on finance and growth that emerged following the 
insights of the early endogenous growth models (Romer, 1990; Grossman & Helpman, 1991; 
Lucas, 1988) have documented three main channels to growth: 1) the rise in the rate of private 
savings; 2) increase in the efficiency of the financial intermediation process and; 3) the rise in 
the social productivity of capital (Pagano, 1993). Within the framework of our study, only the 
first two points are taken into consideration. For organizational purposes, the financial variables 
are presented in terms of financial intermediary dynamics of depth (money), activity (credit), 
efficiency and size. Firstly, from a financial depth standpoint, we are consistent with the FDSD 
and recent African finance literature (Asongu, 2012c) in measuring financial depth both from 
overall-economic and financial system perspectives with indicators of broad money supply 
(M2/GDP) and financial system deposits (Fdgdp) respectively. Whereas the former represents 
the monetary base plus demand, saving and time deposits, the latter denotes liquid liabilities of 
the financial system. It is interesting to distinguish between these two aggregates of money 
supply because, since we are dealing exclusively with African countries, a great chunk of the 
monetary base does not transit through the banking sector.  Secondly, financial activity is 
appreciated in terms of credit allocation. Thus, the paper seeks to appreciate the ability of banks 
to grant credit to economic operators.  We use measurements of both banking-system-activity 
and financial-system-activity in terms of “private domestic credit by deposit banks: Pcrb” and 
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“private credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions: Pcrbof” respectively. Thirdly, 
financial intermediary size is measured in terms of deposit bank assets as a proportion of total 
assets (deposit bank assets plus central bank assets). Fourthly, financial efficiency
3
 appreciates 
the ability of deposits (money) to be converted into credit (financial activity). This fourth 
measure appreciates the fundamental role of banks in transforming mobilized deposits 
(savings) into credit for businesses or the private sector (Asongu, 2011b). Accordingly, we 
adopt indicators of banking-system-efficiency and financial-system-efficiency (respectively 
‘bank credit on bank deposits: Bcbd’ and ‘financial system credit on financial system deposits: 
Fcfd’). The correlation analysis presented in Appendix 3 shows that, employment of two 
variables in almost every financial dynamic category is a form of robustness check. Hence, we 
are able to cross-check financial system results with those of the banking system for the most 
part. Three measures of economic growth are employed: GDP growth, GDP per capita growth 
and real GDP output. While the first two are in growth rate, the last is in natural logarithm.  
 
2.2 Methodology 
 
 The estimation technique typically follows mainstream literature on testing the short-run 
effect of financial variables on economic activity (Starr, 2005). The approach entails unit tests 
to examine the stationarity properties of the variables before a Granger causality approach is 
used to examine the short-term effects (Engle & Granger, 1987). Impulse response functions 
are used to further assess the tendencies of significant Granger causality results. 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
 
3.1 Unit root tests  
 
The assessment of stationarity is based on two types of first generational panel unit root 
tests.  When the variables exhibit unit roots in levels, we accordingly test for stationarity in 
                                                 
3
 By financial efficiency here, we neither refer to the profitability-related concept (notion) nor to the production 
efficiency of decision making units in the financial sector (via Data Envelopment Analysis). 
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their first differences. Employment of the Granger causality approach requires that the 
variables do not have a unit root (or are stationary). Two main types of panel unit root tests 
have been documented: first generational (that is based cross-sectional independence) and the 
second generational (which supposes cross-sectional dependence). A necessary condition for 
the employment of the latter generational test is a cross-sectional dependence test which is only 
applicable if the number of cross-sections (N) in the panel is above the number of periods in the 
cross-sections (T). Given that we have 31 periods (T) and 5(or 4) cross-sections (N), we are 
limited to the first generational type. Therefore, both the Levin, Lin & Chu (LLC, 2002) and 
Im, Pesaran & Shin (IPS, 2003) tests are employed. While the former is a homogenous based 
panel unit root test (with a common unit as null hypothesis), the latter is a heterogeneous 
oriented test (with individual unit roots as null hypotheses). In case of conflicting results, IPS 
(2003) takes precedence over LLC (2002) in decision making because, consistent with Maddala 
& Wu (1999), the alternative hypothesis of LLC (2002) is too powerful. In line with Liew 
(2004), goodness of fit (or optimal lag selection) for model specification is ensured by the 
Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion (HQC) and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) for 
the LLC (2002) and IPS (2003) tests respectively.  
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Table 1: Panel unit root tests 
            
  Panel A: Unit root tests for the WAMZ  
    
  Finance  Economic Growth  
  F. Depth (Money) Fin.  Efficiency F. Activity (Credit) F. Size  GDP growth rates Real 
  M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba   GDPg GDPpcg Output 
  LLC tests for homogenous panel 
Level c 0.879 1.252 -0.738 -2.89*** 2.150 2.142 3.028 -6.24*** -6.16*** 3.229 
ct -0.828 0.200 0.691 -0.125 2.390 2.612 0.047 -6.23*** -6.71*** -1.024 
First 
difference 
c -5.01*** -2.81*** -6.65*** -3.80*** -2.10** -1.130 -8.82*** n.a n.a -6.61*** 
ct -3.58*** -4.14*** -6.20*** -3.46*** -2.82*** -2.30** -4.57*** n.a n.a -6.49*** 
            
  IPS tests for heterogeneous panel 
Level c 0.103 0.647 0.101 -1.52* 2.513 2.398 1.844 -5.77*** -5.62*** 3.865 
ct -0.828 -0.121 1.616 -1.34* 3.685 3.840 -0.799 -5.89*** -6.10*** -0.159 
First 
difference 
c -6.47*** -4.71*** -6.79*** -4.10*** -3.33*** -2.39*** -9.36*** n.a n.a -7.36*** 
ct -5.54*** -5.52*** -6.42*** -3.86*** -3.15*** -2.98*** -9.05*** n.a n.a -7.93*** 
            
  Panel B: Unit root tests for the EAMZ  
    
  Finance  Economic Growth  
  F. Depth (Money) Fin.  Efficiency F. Activity (Credit) F. Size  GDP growth rates Real 
  M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba   GDPg GDPpcg Output 
 LLC tests for homogenous panel 
Level c 4.969 5.386 -0.461 -0.774 2.478 2.009 0.912 -5.25*** -6.26*** 1.459 
ct 3.126 2.463 0.304 1.517 2.778 2.631 0.566 -5.17*** -0.861 1.730 
First 
difference 
c -3.36*** -2.86*** -9.25*** -1.86** -0.135 -2.80*** -9.67*** n.a n.a -7.03*** 
ct -3.74*** -3.08*** -9.10*** 1.054 -0.888 -6.60*** -4.63*** n.a n.a -5.40*** 
            
  IPS tests for heterogeneous panel  
Level c 4.028 5.061 -1.324* -1.70** 2.234 1.817 1.192 -4.94*** -6.09*** 2.358 
ct 2.126 2.289 0.002 -2.49*** -0.227 -0.430 0.260 -4.54*** -3.15*** -0.026 
First 
difference 
c -3.71*** -3.66*** -8.73*** n.a -3.16*** -3.62*** -10.7*** n.a n.a -6.88*** 
ct -3.29*** -3.20*** -8.94*** n.a  -3.26*** -4.95*** -6.15*** n.a n.a -4.80*** 
            
    Notes: ***, **, *denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. ‘c’ and ‘ct’: ‘constant’ and ‘constant and trend’ respectively. 
Maximum lag is 8 and optimal lags are chosen via HQC for LLC test and  AIC for IPS test. LLC: Levin, Lin & Chu (2002). IPS: Im, Pesaran 
& Shin (2003).  M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Liquid Liabilities. BcBd: Banking System Efficiency. FcFd: Financial System Efficiency. Pcrb: 
Banking System Activity. Pcrbof: Financial System Activity. Dbacba: Deposit Bank Assets on Total Assets. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. 
GDPg: GDP growth. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth. WAMZ: West African Monetary Zone. EAMZ: East African Monetary Zone.  
 
 Table 1 above shows results for the panel unit root tests. While Panel A presents the 
findings for the WAMZ, those of Panel B are of the EAMZ. For both monetary zones, while 
the financial variables are overwhelmingly integrated in the first order (i.e: they can be 
differenced once to be stationary), the economic variables are stationary in levels (with the 
exception of real output). 
 
3.2 Granger causality for finance and growth  
 
Let us consider the following basic bivariate finite-order VAR models: 
 
tiijti
q
j
ijjti
p
j
ijti FinanceGrowthGrowth ,,
0
,
1
,   



               (1) 
 
tiijti
q
j
ijjti
p
j
ijti GrowthFinanceFinance ,,
0
,
1
,   



              (2) 
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where, Growth denotes economic prosperity (GDP growth, GDP per capita growth or real GDP 
output) while, Finance represents financial development dynamics (of depth, efficiency, 
activity and size).  
Simple Granger causality is based on the assessment of how past values of a financial 
indicator could help past values of a growth indicator in explaining the present value of the 
growth indicator (Eq. 1). In the same vein, it also implies investigating how past values of 
growth variables are significant in helping the past values of financial variables to explain the 
present value of financial variables (Eq. 2). In mainstream literature, this model is applied on 
variables that do not exhibit unit root (in levels for the most part). Within our framework, we 
are applying this test to  all ‘finance and growth’ pairs in both ‘first difference’ and levels for 
three reasons: (1) ensure comparability;  (2) consistency with application of the model to 
stationary variables and; (3) robustness checks in case we might have missed-out something in 
the unit root test specifications.  
In light of the above, the resulting VAR models in first difference are the following:  
 
tiijti
q
j
ijjti
p
j
ijti FinanceGrowthGrowth ,,
0
,
1
,   



           (3) 
 
tiijti
q
j
ijjti
p
j
ijti GrowthFinanceFinance ,,
0
,
1
,   



          (4) 
 
 The null hypothesis of Eq. (4) is the position that, ‘Growth does not Granger cause 
Finance’. Accordingly, a rejection of the null hypothesis is captured by the significant F-
statistics, which is the Wald statistics for the joint hypothesis that estimated parameters of 
lagged values equal zero. Optimal lag selection for goodness of fit is in accordance with Liew 
(2004).  
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Table 2: Short-run Granger causality analysis for the WAMZ 
        
 Panel A: Finance and GDP growth  
 Null Hypothesis: Finance  does not cause GDP growth 
 Financial Depth (Money) Financial  Efficiency Fin. Activity (Credit) Fin. Size 
 M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba 
        
Levels 0.331 0.378 0.152 0.185 0.628 0.623 1.044 
        
 D[M2] D[Fdgdp] D[BcBd] D[FcFd] D[Pcrb] D[Pcrbof] D[Dbacba] 
        
1st  Difference 0.108 0.030 1.050 0.893 0.988 0.963 0.016 
        
        
 Null Hypothesis: GDP growth does not cause Finance 
 Financial Depth (Money) Financial  Efficiency Fin. Activity (Credit) Fin. Size 
 M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba 
        
Levels 0.392 0.365 0.808 1.177 0.912 0.793 3.324** 
        
 D[M2] D[Fdgdp] D[BcBd] D[FcFd] D[Pcrb] D[Pcrbof] D[Dbacba] 
        
1st  Difference 0.405 0.302 1.418 1.738 0.017 0.027 2.160 
        
 Panel B: Finance and GDP per capita growth  
 Null Hypothesis: Finance  does not cause GDP per capita growth 
 Financial Depth (Money) Financial  Efficiency Fin. Activity (Credit) Fin. Size 
 M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba 
        
Levels 0.171 0.222 0.054 0.031 0.331 0.341 0.880 
        
 D[M2] D[Fdgdp] D[BcBd] D[FcFd] D[Pcrb] D[Pcrbof] D[Dbacba] 
1st  Difference 0.134 0.029 0.839 0.631 0.934 0.904 0.015 
        
        
 Null Hypothesis: GDP per capita growth  does not cause Finance 
 Financial Depth (Money) Financial  Efficiency Fin. Activity (Credit) Fin. Size 
 M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba 
        
Levels 0.291 0.249 1.024 1.341 1.024 0.909 3.405** 
        
 D[M2] D[Fdgdp] D[BcBd] D[FcFd] D[Pcrb] D[Pcrbof] D[Dbacba] 
1st  Difference 0.412 0.305 1.431 1.825 0.019 0.029 2.233 
        
 Panel C: Finance and Real GDP Output  
 Null Hypothesis: Finance  does not cause Real GDP Output 
 Financial Depth (Money) Financial  Efficiency Fin. Activity (Credit) Fin. Size 
 M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba 
        
Levels 0.242 0.115 0.068 0.032 0.210 0.197 0.952 
        
 D[M2] D[Fdgdp] D[BcBd] D[FcFd] D[Pcrb] D[Pcrbof] D[Dbacba] 
1st  Difference 0.118 0.054 0.120 0.033 0.112 0.156 2.151 
        
        
 Null Hypothesis: Real GDP Output  does not cause Finance 
 Financial Depth (Money) Financial  Efficiency Fin. Activity (Credit) Fin. Size 
 M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba 
        
Levels 1.531 1.512 8.126*** 9.216*** 9.742*** 10.35*** 0.779 
        
 M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba 
1st  Difference 1.215 1.297 2.370* 2.675* 7.351*** 8.01*** 2.070 
        
M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Liquid liabilities. BcBd: Bank credit on Bank deposit  (Banking System Efficiency). FcFd: Financial credit on 
Financial deposits (Financial System Efficiency). Pcrb: Private domestic credit from deposit banks (Banking System Activity). Pcrbof: Private 
domestic credit from deposit banks and other financial institutions (Financial System Activity). Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on Total assets 
(Banking System Size). Fin: Financial. WAMZ: West African Monetary Zone.  
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Table 3: Short-run Granger causality analysis for the EAMZ 
        
 Panel A: Finance and GDP growth  
 Null Hypothesis: Finance  does not cause GDP growth 
 Financial Depth (Money) Financial  Efficiency Fin. Activity (Credit) Fin. Size 
 M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba 
        
Levels 0.021 0.074 3.732** 7.306*** 1.174 1.912 1.404 
        
 D[M2] D[Fdgdp] D[BcBd] D[FcFd] D[Pcrb] D[Pcrbof] D[Dbacba] 
        
1st  Difference 0.032 0.052 0.571 2.864* 2.801* 2.088 0.015 
        
        
 Null Hypothesis: GDP growth does not cause Finance 
 Financial Depth (Money) Financial  Efficiency Fin. Activity (Credit) Fin. Size 
 M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba 
        
Levels 1.249 1.333 0.048 3.050* 2.399* 2.506* 0.695 
        
 D[M2] D[Fdgdp] D[BcBd] D[FcFd] D[Pcrb] D[Pcrbof] D[Dbacba] 
        
1st  Difference 0.172 0.042 0.522 2.319 2.175 1.311 0.617 
        
 Panel B: Finance and GDP per capita growth  
 Null Hypothesis: Finance  does not cause GDP per capita growth 
 Financial Depth (Money) Financial  Efficiency Fin. Activity (Credit) Fin. Size 
 M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba 
        
Levels 0.258 0.087 6.269*** 8.292*** 2.227 3.551** 1.245 
        
 D[M2] D[Fdgdp] D[BcBd] D[FcFd] D[Pcrb] D[Pcrbof] D[Dbacba] 
1st  Difference 0.248 0.297 0.891 2.810* 3.715** 3.042* 0.082 
        
        
 Null Hypothesis: GDP per capita growth  does not cause Finance 
 Financial Depth (Money) Financial  Efficiency Fin. Activity (Credit) Fin. Size 
 M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba 
        
Levels 1.589 1.675 0.016 2.342 3.232** 2.935* 0.797 
        
 D[M2] D[Fdgdp] D[BcBd] D[FcFd] D[Pcrb] D[Pcrbof] D[Dbacba] 
1st  Difference 0.211 0.146 0.416 2.040 1.671 0.937 0.926 
        
 Panel C: Finance and Real GDP Output  
 Null Hypothesis: Finance  does not cause Real GDP Output 
 Financial Depth (Money) Financial  Efficiency Fin. Activity (Credit) Fin. Size 
 M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba 
        
Levels 0.175 0.163 3.387** 4.183** 0.368 1.338 0.581 
        
 D[M2] D[Fdgdp] D[BcBd] D[FcFd] D[Pcrb] D[Pcrbof] D[Dbacba] 
1st  Difference 1.486 1.357 0.764 3.256** 0.949 1.516 0.390 
        
        
 Null Hypothesis: Real GDP Output  does not cause Finance 
 Financial Depth (Money) Financial  Efficiency Fin. Activity (Credit) Fin. Size 
 M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba 
        
Levels 0.608 0.675 0.707 1.368 0.359 0.143 3.055* 
        
 M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba 
1st  Difference 0.279 0.464 1.687 1.809 0.472 0.415 3.764** 
        
M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Liquid liabilities. BcBd: Bank credit on Bank deposit  (Banking System Efficiency). FcFd: Financial credit on 
Financial deposits (Financial System Efficiency). Pcrb: Private domestic credit from deposit banks (Banking System Activity). Pcrbof: Private 
domestic credit from deposit banks and other financial institutions (Financial System Activity). Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on Total assets 
(Banking System Size). Fin: Financial. Fin: Financial. EAMZ: East African Monetary Zone. 
  
Table 2 and Table 3 above present Granger causality results for the WAMZ and the 
EAMZ respectively. Regardless of tables, Panel A, Panel B and Panel C show ‘Finance and 
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GDP growth’, ‘Finance and GDP per capita growth’ and ‘Finance and real GDP output’ 
causality estimations respectively. The Schumpeterian thesis is based on the top-half of each 
panel which has a null hypothesis of: ‘Finance does not Granger cause Growth’. The bottom 
halves (with null hypotheses: ‘Growth does not Granger cause Finance’) are relevant 
complementary assessments of tendencies in the finance-growth nexus.  
From the results in Table 2, the following could be established: (1) there is 
overwhelmingly no evidence of finance causing growth; (2) real GDP output causes financial 
allocation efficiency and financial activity and; (3) the scanty evidence of GDP growth and 
GDP per capita growth causing financial size is not very robust because of ‘level significance’4. 
The following conclusions could be derived from Table 3: (1) financial allocation efficiency is 
instrumental in GDP growth, GDP per capita growth and real GDP output, while financial 
activity causes only GDP growth and GDP per capita growth and; (2) the evidence of growth 
causing financial development can only be validated for financial size (Panel C) with respect to 
real GDP output because it is both significant in levels and first difference
5
. The simple fact 
that we have seen evidence of Granger causality flowing from some financial variables to 
growth dynamics is not enough to draw any economic inferences. Hence, the impulse-response 
functions (IRFs) of such relationships should provide additional material on the scale and 
timing of a one standard deviation shock in the financial variables and the responses of the 
growth dynamics.   
 
3.3 Impulse response for the EAMZ 
 
Using a Choleski decomposition on a VAR with ordering: 1) financial variable, 2) 
growth dynamic; we compute IRFs for the finance-growth nexus. We know from intuition that 
the Schumpeterian thesis advocates for positive spillovers of financial services on growth. 
                                                 
4
 It should be recalled that financial size for the WAMZ is stationary only in first difference (see Panel A in Table 
1).  
5
 Financial size for the EAMZ is also stationary only in first difference (see Panel B of Table 1).  
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Hence, we expect positive shocks in financial services (financial system efficiency, banking 
system activity and financial system activity) to improve growth dynamics at least in the short-
run because of the long-run neutrality of money. Appendix 4-9 show graphs corresponding to 
the IRFs. The dotted lines are the two standard deviation bands, which are used to measure the 
significance (Agénor  et al., 1997, p. 19). It could be observed that, but for the responses of 
GDP growth (GDP per capita growth) to financial system efficiency in Appendix 4 (6)
6
, there 
is an overwhelming significant positive short-run impact on the temporary components of the 
growth dynamics.  Convergence of the effect to zero towards the 10
th
 year confirms the long-
run neutrality of monetary policy variables on real output (growth).  
 
3.4 Robustness checks 
 
In order to ensure that our results and estimations are robust, we have checked and 
performed the following.  (1) For almost every financial variable (depth, efficiency or activity), 
two indicators have been used.  Hence, the findings have broadly encapsulated measures of 
financial development dynamics both from banking and financial system perspectives. (2) 
Three measures of economic growth have been employed as well to capture growth both from 
overall economic, per capita and real output standpoints. (3) Both homogenous and 
heterogeneous assumptions have been considered in the unit root tests. (4) Optimal lag 
selection for model specifications has been consistent with the goodness of fit 
recommendations of Liew (2004)
7
. (5) Granger causality has been performed both in level and 
first difference equations. (6) Impulse response functions have been used to further assess the 
                                                 
6
 A possible explanation for these initial negative responses is the substantially documented evidence of surplus 
liquidity issues in African financial institutions (Saxegaard, 2006; Fouda, 2009).  
7
 “The major findings in the current simulation study are previewed as follows. First, these criteria managed to 
pick up the correct lag length at least half of the time in small sample. Second, this performance increases 
substantially as sample size grows. Third, with relatively large sample (120 or more observations), HQC is found 
to outdo the rest in correctly identifying the true lag length. In contrast, AIC and FPE should be a better choice 
for smaller sample. Fourth, AIC and FPE are found to produce the least probability of under estimation among all 
criteria under study. Finally, the problem of over estimation, however, is negligible in all cases. The findings in 
this simulation study, besides providing formal groundwork supportive of the popular choice of AIC in previous 
empirical researches, may as well serve as useful guiding principles for future economic researches in the 
determination of autoregressive lag length” (Liew, 2004, p. 2).  
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tendencies of significant Granger causality results and correspondingly, the Schumpeterian 
thesis.  
 
3.5 Monetary policy implications  
 
 The traditional discretionary monetary policy arrangement favors a short-run effect of 
changes in monetary policy variables on economic activity (especially real output). This favors 
arrangements such as international economic integration (monetary unions and inflation 
targeting for example). Results of the EAMZ are broadly consistent with this traditional strand.  
The significant absence of any short-run effect of monetary policy on output in the WAMZ is 
consistent with the non-traditional strand of policy regimes that limit the ability of monetary 
authorities to use policy to offset output fluctuations. Thus, the inability of monetary policy to 
affect short-run real GDP is in line with the stance of Week (2010) who views this International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) oriented approach as absurdly inappropriate because a vast majority of 
SSA countries lack the instruments to make monetary policy effective. Hence, the monetary 
authority in the potential WAMZ may not use policy instruments in the short-run to offset 
adverse shocks to output by pursuing either an expansionary or a contractionary policy.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
With the spectre of the Euro crisis looming substantially large and scaring potential 
monetary unions, this study has been a short-run trip to embryonic African monetary zones to 
assess the Schumpeterian thesis for positive spillovers of financial services on growth. 
Causality analysis has been performed with seven financial development and three growth 
indicators in the proposed West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) and East African Monetary 
Zone (EAMZ). The journey has been promising for the EAMZ and lamentable for the WAMZ. 
Results of the EAMZ are broadly consistent with the traditional discretionary monetary policy 
14 
 
arrangements while those of the WAMZ are in line with the non-traditional strand of regimes in 
which policy instruments in the short-run cannot be used to offset adverse shocks to output.  
 
 
Appendices 
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics and Presentation of Countries  
             
   Panel A: Summary Statistics 
   West  African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) East African Monetary Zone (EAMZ) 
   Mean S.D Min. Max. Obser. Mean S.D Min. Max. Obser. 
Economic  
Growth  
Growth 
Rates 
GDPg 3.459 5.499 -19.01 27.462 124 4.077 6.606 -50.24 35.22 143 
GDPpcg 0.740 5.108 -18.63 22.61 124 1.208 6.246 -46.89 37.83 143 
Real  Output  9.521 0.855 8.248 11.31 124 9.581 0.456 8.774 10.49 147 
 
 
 
Finance 
Fin. 
Depth  
M2 0.226 0.116 0.091 0.796 114 0.224 0.118 0.046 0.498 134 
Fdgdp 0.154 0.093 0.045 0.600 114 0.171 0.110 0.026 0.414 134 
Fin. 
Efficiency 
BcBd 0.625 0.347 0.173 2.103 117 0.676 0.282 0.070 1.609 146 
FcFd 0.629 0.326 0.209 1.812 114 0.819 0.357 0.139 1.968 134 
Fin. 
Activity  
Pcrb 0.096 0.066 0.014 0.350 114 0.112 0.074 0.011 0.255 134 
Pcrbof  0.099 0.068 0.014 0.368 114 0.137 0.097 0.011 0.349 134 
Fin. Size Dbacba 0.502 0.273 0.054 1.350 117 0.628 0.198 0.110 0.999 141 
             
   Panel B: Presentation of countries 
 
West  African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) The Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone 
East African Monetary Zone (EAMZ) Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania 
             
S.D: Standard  Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obser : Observations. Fin: Financial. 
 
Appendix 2: Variable Definitions 
Variables  Signs Variable Definitions Sources 
    
Economic Prosperity  GDPg GDP Growth  (Annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Per Capita Economic Prosperity  GDPpcg GDP Per Capita Growth (Annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Real Output  Output  Logarithm of Real GDP World Bank (WDI) 
    
Economic financial depth 
(Money Supply) 
M2 Monetary Base plus demand, saving and time 
deposits (% of GDP) 
World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial system depth (Liquid 
liabilities) 
Fdgdp Financial system deposits (% of GDP)   World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Banking system allocation 
efficiency 
BcBd Bank credit on Bank deposits World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial system allocation 
efficiency 
FcFd Financial system credit on Financial system deposits  World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Banking system activity Pcrb Private credit by deposit banks (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial system activity Pcrbof Private credit by deposit banks and other financial 
institutions (% of GDP) 
World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Banking System Size  Dbacba  Deposit bank assets/ Total assets (Deposit bank assets 
plus Central bank assets) 
World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Infl: Inflation. M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Liquid liabilities. BcBd: Bank credit on Bank deposits. FcFd: Financial system credit on Financial 
system deposits. Pcrb: Private domestic credit by deposit banks. Pcrbof: Private domestic credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions. 
WDI: World Development Indicators. FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database. GDP: Gross Domestic Product.  
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Appendix 3: Correlation Matrices  
           
Panel A: West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) 
Economic Growth Financial Depth Fin. Efficiency Financial Activity F. Size  
GDPg GDPpcg Output M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba  
1.000 0.985 0.080 0.097 0.109 0.069 0.062 0.101 0.100 0.183 GDPg 
 1.000 0.124 0.050 0.065 0.055 0.043 0.057 0.057 0.127 GDPpcg 
  1.000 -0.175 -0.105 0.294 0.238 0.108 0.150 0.079 Output 
   1.000 0.990 0.020 0.022 0.646 0.634 0.478 M2 
    1.000 0.062 0.056 0.682 0.675 0.537 Fdgdp 
     1.000 0.966 0.746 0.745 0.528 BcBd 
      1.000 0.731 0.735 0.547 FcFd 
       1.000 0.994 0.780 Pcrb 
        1.000 0.766 Pcrbof 
         1.000 Dbacba 
           
Panel B: East African Monetary Zone (EAMZ) 
Economic Growth Financial Depth Fin. Efficiency Financial Activity F. Size  
GDPg GDPpcg Output M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba  
1.000 0.951 0.205 -0.115 -0.072 -0.162 -0.357 -0.199 -0.243 0.008 GDPg 
 1.000 0.173 -0.150 -0.110 -0.162 -0.344 -0.224 -0.276 -0.012 GDPpcg 
  1.000 0.427 0.497 -0.447 -0.665 0.215 0.152 0.374 Output 
   1.000 0.989 0.148 0.010 0.893 0.912 0.583 M2 
    1.000 0.106 -0.057 0.884 0.900 0.576 Fdgdp 
     1.000 0.870 0.450 0.461 0.234 BcBd 
      1.000 0.278 0.344 0.079 FcFd 
       1.000 0.953 0.600 Pcrb 
        1.000 0.533 Pcrbof 
         1.000 Dbacba 
           
M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Liquid liabilities. BcBd: Bank credit on Bank deposit  (Banking System Efficiency). FcFd: Financial credit on 
Financial deposits (Financial System Efficiency). Pcrb: Private domestic credit by deposit banks (Banking System Activity). Pcrbof: Private 
credit from deposit banks and other financial institutions (Financial System Activity). Dbacba: Deposit bank asset on Total assets (Banking 
System Size). Fin: Financial. Fin: Financial. 
    
 
Appendix 4: Financial System Efficiency and GDP growth (EAMZ) 
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Appendix 5: Banking System Activity and GDP growth (EAMZ) 
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Appendix 6: Financial System Efficiency and GDP per capita growth (EAMZ) 
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Appendix 7: Banking System Activity and GDP per capita growth (EAMZ) 
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Appendix 8: Financial System Activity and GDP per capita growth (EAMZ) 
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Appendix 9: Financial System Efficiency and real GDP output (EAMZ) 
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